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Abstract. Biologically important but dangerous wildlife creatures encroach into cities, 
which causes human-wildlife conflicts. To explore the effect of the encroachment of wildlife 
into cities on equilibrium land use and its efficiency, we develop an equilibrium theory of 
land used for humans and wildlife by combining an ecosystem model with urban economics 
model. Humans choose their housing location and size in response to the risk of 
encountering wildlife in cities, and animals optimize their food intake by spreading out in 
response to heterogeneous feeding grounds in both urban areas and natural habitats, which 
determines the spatial heterogeneous distribution of both agents. We first prove the existence 
and uniqueness of the spatial equilibrium in a linear city adjacent to natural habitats. Next, 
our theory provides new insights for the wildlife conservation: (i) this spatial heterogeneity 
generates inefficient predator-prey interactions, leading to an inefficient steady state 
population equilibrium of animals; (ii) With the spatial inefficiency, the equilibrium city size 
is not always too big. We numerically demonstrate how both the equilibrium and the optimal 
solution are affected by the scale of conflicts and the value of wildlife. 
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1. Introduction 
While wild animals constitute biodiversity and thus bring a positive externality that has 
public goods charactristics, they bring about negative externalities when they approach 
people. For example, some wildlife—large carnivores, mosquitoes, and so on—encroach 
into cities and harm humans or pets through injury, infectious deseases, and, in extreme 
cases, loss of life (Penteriani et al., 2016).1 Indeed, in many cities worldwide, conflicts 
between people and urban beasts are reported. For example, Rome has a problem with wild 
boars; wolves mingle with suburban Gemans; mountain lions frequent Los Angeles (The 
Guardian, 2017).2 Therefore, a certain distance between humans and wildlife is important to 
resolve human–wildlife conflicts and conserve biological resources efficiently.3 
This paper develops a novel model considering spatial density of land use of humans and 
an ecosystem, and studies the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium where wildlife 
interacts with humans within cities. In addition, we investigate how animal behavior, 
residents’ location choice, and city size deviate from the first-best social optimum where the 
social planner controls all endogenous variables including animal behavior. This exploration 
is indispensable for making ecological and urban policies such as land use regulations.4  
 
1 According to World’s Deadliest Animals (reporting the number of people killed by animals per year) 
mosquitoes carrying malaria kill 830,000 humans every year and are the deadliest animal on earth. See 
https://www.gatesnotes.com/Health/Most-Deadly-Animal-Mosquito-Week-2016 (accessed November 29, 
2017) 
2 The Guardian (May 2017) further reports “All around the world, city life seems to be increasingly 
conducive to wildlife. Urban nature is no longer unglamorous feral pigeons or urban foxes. Wolves have 
taken up residence in parts of suburban Germany as densely populated as Cambridge or Newcastle. The 
highest density of peregrine falcons anywhere in the world is New York; the second highest is London, 
and these spectacular birds of prey now breed in almost every major British city. And all kinds of wild 
deer are rampaging through London, while also taking up residence everywhere from Nara in Japan to the 
Twin Cities of the US.” 
3 The WWF report identifies basic list of available and tested solutions for human–wildlife conflicts. One 
solution is land-use planning that ensures that both humans and animals have the space they need is possible. 
For example, protecting key areas for wildlife, creating buffer zones and investing in alternative land uses are 
some of the solutions. See https://wwf.panda.org/our_work/wildlife/human_wildlife_conflict/ (accessed 
Jaunuary 25, 2019) 
4 In reality, we cannot effectively allocate all natural resources including animals’ behavior. However, it may 
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It is recognized that biodiverisity provides humans with important benefits.5 However, 
nations worldwide have experienced urban land expansion, reducing the size of the natural 
habitats, which leads to biodiversity loss (e.g. Pidgeon et al., 2007; Radeloff et al., 2010; 
Seto et al., 2012). Weitzman (1992) and Solow et al. (1993) attempt to value the biodiversity 
based on the genetic distance. Brock and Xepapadeas (2003) develop a conceptual 
framework for valuing biodiversity in terms of ecosystem services. Moreover, some studies 
analyze what size of habitat must remain to sustain the ecosystem service (e.g. Walker, 2001; 
Eppink et al., 2004). On the other hand, protection or extermination of certain species by 
humans might have unexpected results such as an extinction of other species. To optimally 
control biological resources, we need to integrate an economic model and an ecosystem 
having predator-prey interactions. 
The work of integrating the micro-founded ecosystem model with the economic model 
was initiated by Eichner and Pethig (2006, 2009). They apply the ecosystem model that has 
been developed in the ecological literature (e.g. Hannon, 1976; Crocker and Tschirhart, 
1992; Tschirhart, 2000). Eichner and Pethig (2006, 2009) focus on land use competition 
between wildlife and humans, implying that the sizes of both natural habitat and land used 
 
be possible for humans to change the animals’ behavior at least to some extent by using some policies such as 
fences and food traps to attract the animals. If we take some concrete second-best measures, we can evaluate 
how useful these are. Yoshida and Kono (in press) analyze how close the social welfare approaches the ideal 
first best optimum by adopting the second-best land use policies. Environmental management through land use 
policy has been widely studied. The effects of urban land use and transportation policies on the energy footprint 
have been explored by Larson, Liu, and Yezer (2012), Larson and Yezer (2015), and Borck (2016). The optimal 
energy taxation and its effect on urban spatial structure has been studied by Borck and Brueckner (2018). 
Brueckner (2000) presents a simple framework in which urban expansion reduces the amount of open space 
available, so that equilibrium cities are too large. The externality in his paper is driven by the amenity value of 
undeveloped land. So, it is interpreted as benefits from wildlife preservation. The effects of land use regulation 
on the wildlife preservation through changes in the spatial land use of animals have not been considered by the 
previous papers. 
5 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) reports that ecosystem services can be classified into four 
categories: provisioning services (e.g. food and fresh water), regulating services (e.g. climate regulation and 
disease control), cultural services (e.g. landscape esthetics and recreation), and supporting services (e.g. 
nutrient cycling and soil formation). 
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by humans are endogenously determined. They show that the optimal city size is smaller 
than the laissez-faire equilibrium city size because an increase in natural habitats can 
maintain the supply of ecosystem services to humans.6 
The externalities identified in these previous papers are independent of spatial land use 
of humans and wild animals. But in a real city, they influence each other, and the degrees of 
their influences depend on their spatial land use. For example, some species inhabit not only 
suburban areas but also developed areas (Woodroffe et al., 2005). For example, foxes in 
London and coyotes in Chicago and California sometimes attack domestic animals and 
residents, and bloodsucking mosquitoes and mites infect humans. These are negative 
externalities which must be reduced by keeping some distance between humans and wildlife. 
We summarize the arguments as follows. The value of a species depends on its distance 
from humans. When humans and wildlife are close to each other, a negative externality such 
as injury and loss of life may occur. The amount of the externality depends on the duration of 
their coexisttence in the same place, the number of species entering urban areas, and human 
population density. To solve the human-wildlife conflict, a distance dimension, which has 
been absent in previous models, is required.  
This paper focuses on modeling the above-mentioned mechanisms to identify location- 
dependent market failures in urban areas and natural habitats. Technically, we add a 
continuous distance dimension to the urban-habitat-allocation model of Eichner and Pethig 
(2006, 2009), extending the traditional urban economic model (e.g. Alonso, 1964) to have 
natural habitats with animals.7 To explicitly model the spatial distribution of wild animals, 
we introduce a time density as the population density of wildlife at each location. This 
 
6 In the study of Eichner and Pethig (2006), the social planner solves her maximization problem by taking the 
individual organism’s behavior as given.  
7 In Eichner and Pethig (2006, 2009), the urban area is used only for production of composite goods. However, 
to handle the human-wildlife conflict, we consider residential districts. So, we use the urban economics model. 
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indicates the total amount of time that an animal spends at each point in one year.  
To take the effects of the interaction between certain species and humans on other 
species into account, we consider a food chain of three species: plants as a producer, 
herbivores feeding on plants, and carnivores feeding on herbivores. All of the animals 
behave so as to maximize their net offspring, as in Eichner and Pethig (2006, 2009). To 
generate the offspring, the animal searches the habitat for prey species, while trying to avoid 
encountering predators. In other words, the animal chooses its favorable time density so as to 
maximize its net offspring, taking the other species’ time densities as given, subject to a time 
constraint.8 Carnivores search the city for human-related sources of food such as garbage.9 
Then, humans have disutility of a risk of encountering carnivores. On the other hand, they 
benefit from ecosystem services depending on the numbers of all species.  
To consider of the dynamic population of wildlife in the simplest possible way, we 
employ a traditional dynamic population growth model called the Lotka-Volterra model, and 
we put the wildlife behavior into the model. This enables us to focus on a steady-state 
population equilibrium, and to show how the complex human-wildlife interactions affect the 
population equilibrium through the food chain. 
Finally, we explore characteristics of market failures in terms of the time density of 
animals at each location by comparing the first-best optimum with the equilibrium. We find 
that i) there exists a unique equilibrium in the model; ii) unless the plant densities are 
spatially uniform, the animals’ behavior deviates from the first-best optimum at each 
location within not only cities but also the natural habitat; iii) the first-best optimal city size 
 
8 In Eichner and Pethig (2006, 2009), the animal is assumed to trade his/her own biomass in a virtual 
competitive market. But, we do not follow this idea because the time constraint is more natural for animals. 
9 The geographic distribution of coyotes has expanded dramatically across North and central America (Hody 
and Kays, 2018), and their presence in urban areas has often elicited concern from the public (Gehrt, 2009, 
Baker and Timm 2017). Fedriani et al. (2001) found human-related foods in as much as 25% of coyote diets in 
areas of high human population densities in southern California. 
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can be larger or smaller than the equilibrium city size. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 combines a closed monocentric city with an 
ecosystem model. Section 3 shows the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium allocation. 
Section 4 defines the first-best optimum, then derives the values of species and their 
components, and it shows how the animals’ and humans’ behavior bring about market 
failures. Section 5 shows numerical simulations. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
2.1 City and natural habitat 
Consider a closed monocentric city adjacent to a natural habitat. There are 2 hN  identical 
households in the city and land is equally owned by the city residents.10 For simplicity, the 
city population equals the number of households. The city is linear with the width of one 
unity, and the size is defined by [ ,Z ]H Hx Z  , where x denotes a distance from the city 
center, and HZ  is an urban boundary. The city is symmetric, and the right hand side (RHS, 
hereafter) has hN  population. We ignore the production of housing and assume that land is 
directly used by residents. Households do not enter the habitat.  
There is an ecosystem in the habitat. In order to represent the ecosystem in the simplest 
possible framework, we suppose a food-chain of three species indexed by i: carnivores (i = 
3) feed on herbivores (i = 2), herbivores feed on plants (i = 1), and plants take up nutrients 
from the land. The populations are denoted by 1 2 3{ , , }N N NN . All animals or organisms 
belonging to the same species are assumed to be identical. 
Carnivores and herbivores search the habitat for prey species, and eat prey species when 
 
10 This is a typical urban economics model, which is referred to as the closed-city model under public 
landownership (CCP) by Fujita (1989). 
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meeting them. Suppose that only carnivores leave the habitat up to location [0,  ]HX Z  in 
the residential area to seek human-origin food such as garbage. X is endogenously 
determined. Closer to the CBD, the availability of garbage to carnivores increases because of 
an increase in human population density, whereas the risk of being killed by people increases 
with time spent in the city. Carnivores determine their search boundary X by equalizing the 
marginal benefit with respect to distance to the marginal cost.  
The land is divided into the following three zones: (i) a point central business district (a 
point CBD) ( 0x  ), (ii) housing zone (called the human zone) ( [0, ]Hx Z ), and (iii) the 
natural habitat (called the animal zone) ( [ ,  ]H Ax Z Z ), where AZ  is the boundary of the 
natural habitat. Superscript H indicates the human zone, and A indicates the animal zone 
throughout the paper. Following a real land use pattern, the geographical pattern is assumed 
as depicted in Figure 1, which shows only the right hand side of the land.11 We model each 
agent’s behavior for one year in a steady state. 
[Figure 1 here] 
2.2 Ecosystem model  
An individual animal or organism of species i, called individual i for short, behaves so as to 
maximize its net offspring, as set in some papers including Eichner and Pethig (2006, 2009). 
This behavior is supposed to be essential for continuation of a species. To produce offspring, 
individual i feeds on prey species to take in nutrients, while trying to avoid encountering its 
predator species as much as possible. For simple analysis, we express such instinctive 
behavior by the traditional Lotka-Volterra-type equation: 
i i i i i ib Q M m    ,                          (1) 
where bi is individual i’s offspring, iQ  is individual i’s intake of prey, iM  is the number of 
 
11 To focus on the case where carnivores enter residential areas, this model omits the land used for agriculture.  
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predators that individual i encounter, and im  is a positive parameter representing individual 
i’s loss rates due to natural death. 0i   is individual i’s reproduction efficiency per prey 
eaten, and 0i   is individual i’s reproduction loss per encounter with predators. 
Based on the common behavior of organisms, we develop a model that can capture the 
spatial aspect of the behavior of organisms. The following model can apply to any mobile 
organisms. In the paper, it applies to herbivores and carnivores (i = 2, 3).  
The individual i spends time to search zone j for prey species and consumes them when 
encountering them. So, ji ijQ Q , where jiQ  is individual i’s intake of prey species in 
zone j. The individual i’s expected intake of prey species at location x depends on the time 
density of individual i in zone j and the density of individual i’s prey species in zone j. The 
time density is formally defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1. Individual i’s time density within zone j (i = 2, 3 and j = H, A), ( )jit x , 
indicates the total length of time that individual i spends at location x within zone j for eating 
in certain time periods.  
 
The time density, ( )jit x , which maximizes the net offspring, depends on the location. 
Actually, some empirical ecological studies (e.g., Yoda et al., 2012; Pyke, 2015) show that 
animals optimize their food intake by spreading out in response to the current heterogeneity 
of each feeding ground.  
The sum of intake of prey species per individual i in zone j is expressed by integrating 
the expected intake of prey species at location x over the search range: 
,( ) ( )j
i
j j j
i i i preyDQ t x n x dx  ,  (2) 
where , ( )ji preyn x  is the density of individual i’s prey species at location x in zone j and jiD  
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is individual i’s search range in zone j, that is, 3 [ , ]H HD X Z  and 3 2A AD D   [ , ]H AZ Z .12 
The individual carnivore (i = 3) eats herbivores (i = 2) in the animal zone and human-origin 
food such as garbage in the human zone. So, 3Q  3 3A HQ Q . 3, 2 2( ) ( )A Apreyn x t x N , where 
2 2( )At x N  is the density of harbivores at location x. 3, ( )Hpreyn x  3 3( ( )) ( )H ht x n x , where ( )hn x  
is human population density and 3 3( ( ))Ht x  expresses the availability of garbage.13 The 
representative herbivore (i = 2) searches the animal zone for plants. So, 2 2AQ Q  and 
2, ( )A preyn x  2 2 1( ( )) ( )At x n x , where 1 ( )n x is the density of plants and 2 2( ( ))At x  expresses 
the availability of plants. 
Similarly, ji ijM M , where jiM  is the number of predators that individual i may 
encounter in zone j. jiM  is expressed by integrating ( )jit x  multiplied by the density of 
predators at location x , ( )ji predatorn x  over its search range:  
,( ) ( )ji
j j j
i i i predatorDM t x n x dx  .  (3) 
In the human zone, the carnivore may encounter humans and might be killed by them. So, 
3 3
HM M  and 3, ( ) ( ) ( )Hpredator hn x k x n x , where ( )k x  is a parameter that explains humans’ 
chance of encountering carnivores.14 The herbivores may encounter carnivores in the animal 
zone. So, 2 2AM M  and 2, 3 3( ) ( )A Apredatorn x t x N , which is the density of carnivores at 
location x. The time constraint for individual i is  
 
12 We do not have to divide ( )jit x  by Ni because ( )jit x  is the individual i’s time density and ,( ) ( )j ji i preyt x n x  
is the food consumption per individual i at location x. 
13 We assume that ρi(·) > 0 in ( ) [0,  1]jit x   to avoid a case in which individual i’s intake of food is negative 
and that ρ′i(·) < 0, and ρ″i(·) < 0, implying that the more food individual i eats, the more difficult it is to find 
new food at location x. For example, the availability of foof waste in garbage to carnivores in the city depends 
on the garbage cans, and the availability of plants to herbivores in the habitat depends on height of trees and 
topological situation. A carnivore eats food waste in garbage at one location. Then, if the carnivore wants more 
food waste at the same location, it tries to find the new trash container and break it open. However, in order to 
obtain more food, it is easier to move to a different location and find new garbage than to stay and search for 
food at the same location. In this way, function ρi(·) is exogenously given and is used for the situation where 
animals have foods that are not moving objects. It is not applicable to carnivores’ food, “herbivores”, because 
herbivores can avoid encountering predators by themselves, and thus 3, 2 2( ) ( )A Apreyn x t x N  is enough to express 
such a situation. 
14 The value of the parameter increases with x (i.e. ( ) 0k x  ). It implies that the closer to the CBD they are, 
the more chances they have of meeting humans. 
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( )j
i
j
iDj
T t x dx ,  (4) 
 
where T  is one year, ( )j
i
j
iD t x dx  is the time spent searching in zone j.15  
Individual i maximizes function (1) by controlling jiQ , jiM , ( )jit x  subject to (2)–(4), 
taking the prey and predator’s densities as given. In addition to these variables, the boundary 
of search range X is also endogenous in the case of carnivores. The Lagrangian function for 
the maximization problem of each animal and its first order conditions are found in 
Appendix A.16  
2.3 Household behavior  
Each household resides at location [0, ]Hx Z . They commute to the CBD where all firms 
are located and earn exogenous wage w. As carnivores search the human zone for food, 
households may encounter carnivores. The number of carnivores that each household may 
encounter is denoted by ( )hM x , which implies the risk of being injured by carnivores:  
3 3( ) ( )HhM x t x N .  (5) 
To reduce the time density of carnivores, households try to put more risk to the carnivores 
directly by using the risk-increase-measure such as guns or alert or monitoring systems that 
can immediately repel or exterminate carnivores. Thus, the longer the carnivores spend at a 
given location, the more risk of being killed by humans the carnivore faces. The degree of 
risk the carnivore faces is denoted by β3(x), which indicates the probability of extermination 
per unit time the carnivore spends at location x within the city.  
The household spends money on commuting, housing, composite goods, and preparing 
the risk-increase-measure. By installing the risk-increase-measure, the household have a 
 
15 In previous papers (e.g. Eichner and Pethig, 2009), the animal is assumed to trade its own biomass in a 
virtual competitive market. We do not use this idea because the time constraint is more natural for ecosystems.   
16 This model considers the spatial dimension and we want to solve the spatial path of time density of both 
animals. In that case, the effect of increasing the time density at each location on social welfare or net offspring 
can be different across locations (that is, the Lagrange multiplier of the time density can be different across 
locations). So, we have to use the optimal control theory to solve the model. For example, see Brueckner 
(2007). By using the theory, we can find that the Lagrange multipliers are constant across locations. In the 
paper, we omit the procedure of the theory for simplicity. 
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sense of security when encountering carnivores at the home. The household’s utility 
increases with the quality of ecosystem services. The quality is determined by the population 
of all species according to the function ( )e E N . We assume that the partial derivative of e 
with respect to N is positive but diminishing marginal benefits. The utility function is  
  1 2 3( ) ( ), ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )hv x u C x f x g M x g x E    N ,  (6) 
where ( )C x  is the consumption of numeraire composite goods, ( )f x  is the housing lot 
size, 1( ( ))hg M x  is the disutility from a fear of encountering carnivores, and 2 3( ( ))g x  is 
the utility gained from a sense of security by installing the risk-increase-measure for 
carnivores. We assume that marginal utilities with respect to C(x), f (x), and β3(x) are positive, 
and diminishing marginal utility with respect to them. The income constraint is given by 
3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w C x r x f x x p x       ,                 (7) 
where   is the per-resident revenue from land ownership, ( )r x  is the land rent at location 
x, ( )x  is the commuting cost depending on distance from the CBD, and p3 is the cost of 
preparing the risk-increase-measure.   should equal or less than per-capita land rent 
revenue.17  
0 [ ( ) ]h H
HZN r x r dx  ,  (8) 
where Hr  is the cost of housing land development, that is, the cost of land conversion from 
natural habitats to residential areas. 
Endogenous and exogenous variables for each agent are summarized in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
2.4 Market clearing conditions and definition 
The populations of carnivores and herbivores are determined by predator-prey interactions. 
 
17 Inequality implies that residents can refuse the receipt of the land revenue. However, as long as per-capita 
land revenue has a positive utility, equality holds in (8). This inequality is useful to derive the sign of the 
Lagrange multiplier for this constraint, simply using the Kuhn-Tucker condition. The same treatment with the 
same objective is shown in Kono and Kawaguchi (2016) and Kono and Joshi (2017). 
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Since bi is individual i’s offspring produced in one year, the dynamics of population change 
is described by the following differential equations: 
                                    ,i i idN N bdT        2,  3i    (9) 
where T is time. The current paper assumes that neither species is extinct. N3 and N2 in a 
steady state are straightforwardly derived from (9) with 3 2 0dN dt dN dt   and (1): 
2 2 2
3
2
,Q mN P


   (10) 
3 3 3 3 3
2
3
HM Q mN P
 

  ,  (11) 
where 
                  2 3( ) ( )A A
A
H
Z
ZP t x t x dx  ,                         (12) 
which implies the probability of an encounter between a carnivore and a herbivore.18 
In the steady state, the plant density at location [ ,  ]H Ax Z Z  is  
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( )An x F x t x N  , (13) 
where ( )F x  is the plant density that grows naturally before being eaten by herbivores and 
1  is a parameter indicating the herbivore’s intake of plants per unit of time. We assume that 
( )F x  is continuous on [ ,  ]H Ax Z Z . The total number of plants is obtained by integrating 
the plant density over the habitat:  
1 1( )
A
H
Z
Z n x dx N .  (14) 
Next, (15) implies that household’s utility will be common across locations because 
households can migrate for free:  
( ) ,  [0,  ]Hv x V x Z   .                           (15) 
Households at location x consume ( )f x  area of lot; therefore, total lot consumed at each 
location equals the unit land area supplied:  
 
18 Since N2 and N3 are independent of x, 3 2AQ PN  and 2 3M PN . 
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( ) ( ) 1hn x f x  .      (16) 
(17) indicates that the total city population hN  equals households’ population:  
0 ( )h h
HZN n x dx  .      (17) 
At the equilibrium, the urban boundary is determined at which the land rent equals the cost 
of housing development: 
( )H Hr Z r .19  (18) 
In this setting, an allocation will mean a collection of continuous functions ( ( )f x , 
( )hn x , ( )r x , ( )hM x , 3 ( )Ht x , 3( )x ) on [0, ZH], continuous functions ( 3 ( )At x , 2 ( )At x ) on 
[ZH, ZA], and (endogenous) variables ( 3HQ , 3AQ , 3,M  2M , 2 ,Q  3,N  2 ,N  1N , V,  , ZH). 
 
3. Laissez-faire equilibrium 
3.1 Equilibrium conditions 
At the equilibrium, human population density is determined as a result of competition for 
housing location among residents. ( )r x  equals the maximum bid rent as a result of 
competition among residents. Mathematically, such bid-rent behavior is formalized as 
 
 
3
3 3
( ), ( ), ( )
( ) ( ) ( )max ( ) ( )C x f x x
w x C x p xr x f x
       s.t. (6) (19) 
Solving (6) for C(x) yields 2 3( ( ) ( ( )), ( ))C G x g x f x , where 1( ) ( ) ( ( ))hG x v x g M x    
( )E N . We substitute this into the objective function. Then, the first order condition with 
respect to β3(x) is  
  2 3 32 3 ( ( ))( ) ( ( ))
C g x pG x g x 
    .  (20) 
Assuming that the size of the risk to carnivores from the households does not affect the 
choice of housing lot size f(x), the maximization problem yields 
 
19 This model does not consider the agricultural area, so that the land rent at the city boundary equals the cost of 
housing development in the market equilibrium. 
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 ( ) ( ), ( )f x f G x I x , (21) 
where ( ) ( )I x w x  . 
Next, we show the time density of animals at the equilibrium. From Appendix A, the 
equilibrium condition with respect to 3 ( )Ht x  at any [ ,  ]Hx X Z  and that with respect to 
 t3A(x)  at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z , taking other species’ behavior  nh(x)  and 2 ( )At x  as given, are 
3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3
( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0( )
H H
h h hH
b t x n x t x n x x k x n xt x      
      , (22) 
3
3 2 2 3
3
( ) 0( )
A
A
b t x Nt x  
    . (23) 
The equilibrium condition with respect to 2 ( )At x  at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z , taking other species’ 
time density  t3A(x)  as given, is 
2
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
2
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0.( )
A A A A
A
b n x t x n x t x t x t x Nt x      
       (24) 
(20)–(24) indicates that the equilibrium land use of humans and animals in both urban area 
and natural habitat. (22)–(24) equations intuitively reflect the animal behavior at each 
location. For example, in (22), it reflects that when the carnivore stays longer at one location, 
it could obtain more foods (the first term), but it could decrease marginal returns of foods 
(the second term) and increase the number of humans the carnivores may encounter, that is, 
face more risk of extermination (the third term) and lose the chance to obtain foods at the 
other locations (the fourth term). 
 
3.2 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium allocation  
This subsection shows that there exists a unique equilibrium allocation that satisfies the 
market clearing conditions and definitions defined in Section 2. We first show that there 
exists a unique equilibrium land use where carnivores enter the city and interact with 
residents. All other endogenous variables are uniquely determined by the unique equilibrium 
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land use, even if any equilibrium land use is determined, using market cleaning conditions 
and definitions. This conclusion is stated at the end of this subsection as Theorem 1.  
We have three steps to prove the uniqueness of equilibrium land use that satisfies 
equilibrium conditions (20)–(24). First, we show that given the equilibrium utility level V, 
and the land use at all other locations, there is a unique equilibrium of housing size and the 
carnivore’s time density at any x in the city. Second, we show that given V, there is a unique 
equilibrium path of housing size, the carnivore’s time density on [0,  ]HZ  and there is a 
unique equilibrium path of both the carnivore’s and the herbivore’s time density in the 
habitat. Finally, we show that V is uniquely determined. Proofs of Lemmas can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Under the assumption that the choice of 3( )x  does not depend on the choice of f(x), 
there exists one inner solution 3( )x  satisfying (20) at any x in the city. Next, substituting  
the obtained 3( )x  into the system of (21) and (22), we can show the uniqueness of 
housing lot size and the carnivore’s time density at any x in the city. 
 
Lemma 1. Housing lot size which is the residents’ best response function of the carnivores’ 
time density, 3( ) ( ( ))Hresf x R t x , monotonically increases with 3 ( )Ht x  on [0, 1]. 
Carnivores’ time density which is the carnivores’ best response function of the housing lot 
size, 3 ( ) ( ( ))H cart x R f x , monotonically decreases with ( )f x . 
  
We illustrate the best response functions of carnivores and residents as Figure 2. At any 
location [ , ]Hx X Z , there exists one inner solution except for the following two kinds of 
corner solutions: (i) Point A is smaller than point B; (ii) point C is lower than point D.20 
 
20 Case (i) may occur if humans are eager to exterminate the harmful carnivores and/or the carnivores’ 
availability of food is quite low because the carnivore do not want to stay even if the human population density 
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Each solution is uniquely determined.  
[Figure 2 here] 
Next, given the utility level V, we show ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 3( )x  are continuous in 
[ , ]HX Z . To prove this, we apply the implicit function theorem to a system of the 
equilibrium conditions with respect to ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 3( )x  for all [ , ]Hx X Z . We 
also investigate whether the equilibrium path of both carnivore’s and herbivore’s time 
density, 3 ( )At x  and 2 ( )At x , are continuous in the habitat [ , ]H AZ Z . We obtain Lemma 2. 
 
Lemma 2. Given the utility level V, there is a unique equilibrium path of ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 
3( )x  in [ , ]HX Z  and 3 ( )At x  and 2 ( )At x  in [ , ]H AZ Z  such that (20)–(24) are satisfied. 
 
   Finally, we have to investigate the uniqueness of the equilibrium utility level V. V is 
determined such that (17), ( )0 ( , )h h
HZ VN n V x dx  , is satisfied. To show the uniqueness of 
V, it is sufficient to prove that the RHS of (17), ( )0 ( , )h
HZ V n V x dx , monotonically changes 
in V. Let ( )V  be the RHS of (17), ( )0 ( , )h
HZ V n V x dx . We can obtain the following. 
 
Lemma 3. ( )V  monotonically decreases with V.  
 
Hence, as shown in Lemmas 1-3, we can obtain that there exists the equilibrium land use. In 
addition, the unique equilibrium paths of ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , 3 ( )At x , 2 ( )At x , and 3( )x  
uniquely determine all other endogenous variables using associated market cleaning 
conditions and definitions.21 We sum up the above analysis in Theorem 1. 
 
 
becomes larger. Case (ii) may occur when wildlife are less dangerous to humans because the housing size is not 
affected by the time density of carnivores. 
21 Lucus and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) also demonstrate that a uniquely determined wage path determines 
associated endogenous variables uniquely.  
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Theorem 1. There is an allocation where all endogenous variables are determined such that 
(2)–(8), (10)–(18), and (20)–(24) are satisfied. Any such allocation is uniquely determined 
by the unique equilibrium land use ( ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , 3 ( )At x , 2 ( )At x , 3( )x ). 
 
3.3 Effect of the encroachment of wildlife into cities on equilibrium land 
use  
From the above analysis, we can obtain the following property about how equilibrium land 
use of humans and animals ( ( )f x , 3( )x , 3 ( )Ht x , 3 ( )At x , 2 ( )At x ) changes with location x.  
 
Property 1 
(i) In the residential area, the time density of carnivores 3 ( )Ht x  first continuously increases, 
then it decreases as it approaches the CBD, and finally it reaches zero. 
(ii) Human population density ( )hn x  continuously decreases with x (i.e. Lot size ( )f x  
continuously increases with x). The decrease in human population density with respect to x 
in the area with carnivores is larger than that in the area without carnivores.  
(iii) The degree of the risk-increase measure that each household sets for carnivores, 3( )x , 
is independent of the location. 
(iv) The time density of herbivores 2 ( )At x  is spatially uniform across the habitat regardless 
of whether the plant density is spatially uniform or not.   
(v) In the habitat, the time density of carnivores 3 ( )At x  is proportional to the plant density 
that grows naturally ( )F x .  
    
First, we focus on Property (i)–(iii). Applying the implicit function theorem to the system of 
equilibrium conditions with respect to ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 3( )x , given in Appendix B, we 
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can obtain ( ) 0df xdx  , 
3 ( )Hdt x
dx  ⋛  0, and 
3( ) 0d xdx
   at any [ , ]Hx X Z . ( ) 0df xdx   
holds because the commuting cost increases with x. In contrast, 3 ( )Ht x  can either increase or 
decrease. As carnivores move towards the CBD, both human population density, ( )hn x , and 
the probability of encountering residents, ( )k x , increase. When the amount of increase in 
( )hn x  is larger (respectively, smaller) than that in ( )k x , 3 ( )Ht x  increases with x because 
carnivores can obtain more (respectively, less) food with less (respectively, more) risk of 
encountering residents by moving towards the CBD. Thus the welfare impacts on residents 
differs in size across space. Reflecting the residents’ fear of encountering carnivores, the land 
rent at location with carnivores is lower than that at locations without carnivores.  
   Next, we focus on Property (iv)–(v). Combining (23) and (4) at which i = 2 yields 
2 ( ) / ( )A A Ht x T Z Z  ; thus we can obtain Property (iv). Combining 2 ( ) / ( )A A Ht x T Z Z   
with (13) and (24) yields Property (v). The reason why we obtain Property (iv) and (v) is 
given as follows. Suppose an equilibrium where 3 ( )At x  is smaller in places with high ( )F x . 
Then, herbivores spend more time there because they are able to eat more plants with less 
risk of encountering carnivores. Hence, there is an incentive for carnivores to deviate from 
this equilibrium. As a result, carnivores choose higher 3 ( )At x  in place with high ( )F x  so 
that herbivores are evenly distributed across the habitat. If ( )F x  is spatially uniform across 
the habitat, then both 3 ( )At x  and 2 ( )At x  are uniform because herbivores can eat the same 
amount of plants everywhere, and carnivores do not have to spend more time in a specific 
location.  
In closing this section, we illustrate one possible example of the equilibrium land use of 
humans and an ecosystem on [0, ZA] as Figure 3 under the case where plant densities that 
grows naturally linearly increases with x. 
[Figure 3 here] 
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4. First-best optimum   
The purpose of this section is to understand how the equilibrium deviates from a social 
optimum due to two externalities: the absence of markets in the ecosystem and 
human–wildlife conflicts. The first best or practically unconstrained optimum requires 
complete regulation of time density of animals at every location in both city and habitat. We 
first formally define the social welfare maximization problem. Then, we explore the sign of 
the marginal social value or shadow price of carnivore S3, herbivore S2, and plant at location 
x s1(x) because it is important to determine how each variable deviates from the social 
optimum. In addition, we clarify how much more knowledge is needed to measure the value 
of each species in the location-dependent setting than in the location-independent setting as 
in Eichner and Pethig (2009). Proof of the following propositions are found in Appendix D. 
4.1 Social welfare function  
The social welfare function W is composed of the total utility of households:22  
hW N V . (25) 
A social planner maximizes the social welfare by controlling all endogenous variables 
including variables related with animal behavior. We define this as the first best optimum. 
3 3 3 3 2 1( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), , , ,, , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), , ,
maxH A H A Hh hC x f x r x n x V Q M P t x t x t x n x Z X N V       N 　   s.t. (2)–(8), and (10)–(17). 
We obtain the social optimal solution using the following Lagrangian function: 
 
 
22 We also analyzed the case where people are concerned about animal welfare in terms of the awareness of 
animal protection. There are some animal protection organizations on a worldwide scale such as the 
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW). In this case we should consider the animals’ utility. The 
following utility function of individual animal in species i is assumed: ui = Ui(Qi, Mi,). The social welfare is 
composed of total utility of households, carnivores and herbivores: 3 3 2 2hW N V N u N u    . Alternatively, this can be regarded as an altruistic utility function of humans by regarding 0   and 0   as weights. 
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     
,　　　　
  
where ( )h x , ( )x ,  , ( )x , ( )x , 1( )s x , 3O , 2O , and iS   1,2,3i  are shadow 
prices.23 The boundary condition is 3 ( ) 0Ht X  . We divide the original Lagrangian function 
by the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to (8),  , to represent it in monetary terms. The 
first order conditions are found in Appendix C.  
4.2 Marginal social value of species  
We can obtain Proposition 1 from the Lagrange multipliers of Eq. (26). 
Proposition 1.  The marginal social value of carnivores, herbivores, and plants at location 
x, or Lagrange multipliers S3, S2, and s1(x) are given by, respectively,  
 
 
23 In the literature of urban economics, the optimal control theory has been applied to distance dimension 
instead of time dimension to obtain optimal solutions at each location (e.g. Pines and Sadka 1985; Arnot, Pines 
and Sadka 1986). This Lagrangian includes distance from the CBD x, and it has three heterogenous regions: 
residential area without carnivores’ entering, residential area with carnivores’ entering, and natural habitat. The 
boundary conditions between heterogenous regions are endogenously determined. A similar type of Lagrangian 
is employed in Kono and Kawaguchi (2016) to explore transport policies in a city with heterogenous regions 
and in Kono and Joshi (2017) to explore land use regulation in multiple heterogenous zones. 
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3
3 30 0
[1] Ecosystem services of carnivores [2] Humans' aggregate disutility of carnivores
( ) ( ) ( )Hhh h
h h
H HZ ZE N g MS n x dx n x t x dxU C U C
         
　 　
,  (27) 
 
2
2 1 1 20
[4] Benefit or cost of a decrease in plants[3]Ecosystem services of herbivores due to being hervested by a herbivore 
( ) ( ) ( )Ah
h
H A
H
Z Z
Z
E NS n x dx s x t x dxU C 
    
　 　
,  (28) 
 
1 2
1 3 2 2 2
20
[6] Benefit or cost of an increase in carnivores[5] Ecosystem services of plants
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))A Ah
h
HZ E Ns x n x dx S t x t xU C P
 
    
　
 [ , ]H Ax Z Z  .  (29) 
 
Considering the location dependent externalities caused by the encroachment of 
carnivores into the urban areas, some novel components are observed in the value of species: 
i) the humans’ aggregate marginal disutility with respect to the risk of being killed by 
carnivores, which is represented by term [2]; ii) the social benefits or damages of changes in 
the steady-state population of the other species, which are represented by terms [4] and [5].24 
Terms [1], [3], and [5] represent the humans’ aggregate marginal benefits of enhancing the 
provision of ecosystem services by a marginal increase in each species.  
These equations imply that the first terms on the right hand side are positive but the 
second terms can be either positive or negative. Thus, these animals and plants are 
biologically important, but their shadow prices can be negative. In addition, the sign of one 
species depends on the sign of other species through the food-chain. It is intuitive that S3 can 
be negative because of the humans’ aggregate disutility of the entrance of carnivores, and S2 
can be negative because of decrease in the number of plants. However, it is not so intuitive 
that s1(x) can be also negative because of the increase in the number of carnivores that can 
 
24 In the current paper the value of species i’s biomass consumed by humans and the opportunity cost of urban 
land use, which are observed in Eichner and Pethig (2009), do not appear in (27)–(29). The former is regarded 
as a part of ecosystem services. Thus this component corresponds with term [1], [3] or [5]. The latter is not 
observed because the current paper does not consider habitat resources such as the territory of animals.  
21  
give the risk to humans.  
 
5. Distance-dependent market failures   
This section is devoted to comparing the equilibrium with the first best optimum in terms of 
time density of animals, 3 3,  ( ) ( )H At x t x , and 2 ( )At x , human population density nh(x), and city 
size ZH. We begin with the time density of animals.  
5.1 The time density of animals 
The optimal condition with respect to the time density of carnivores in the city, 3 ( )Ht x , is   
2 3 3
3 3 2
3 3
  
[8] Benefit or cost of [7] Humans' disutility of      an increase in carnivores     carnivores
( )   ( ) ,( )
Ah
hH
h
S b g M Nn x N S t xP t x U C P
          
             (30) 
where 3
3
0( )H
b
t x
   at the equilibrium as shown in (22). The LHS indicates the benefit or 
cost of changes in herbivores when the time density of carnivores marginally increases at 
[ ,  ]Hx X Z  within the city. The first term on the RHS of (30) represents the humans’ 
aggregate marginal disutility of encountering carnivores. Since the carnivores stay longer in 
the urban area, the herbivore’s risk of encountering carnivores decreases. From (10), this 
leads to increasing the steady state population of carnivores, which is represented by the 
second term on the RHS of (30). Since S3 and S2 can be either positive or negative as shown 
in Proposition 1, we can obtain the following proposition by comparing the equilibrium 
condition (22) with the optimal condition (30). 
 
Proposition 2. The optimal time density of carnivores within the city, 3 ( )Ht x , at any 
[ ,  ]Hx X Z  can be either larger or smaller than the equilibrium 3 ( )Ht x . If the increase in 
humans’ disutility associated with the risk of encountering carnivores is larger than the 
increase in the utility associated with the ecosystem services when the steady state 
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population of carnivores increases (that is, S3 is negative) and if S2 is positive (negative), 
then the optimal 3 ( )Ht x  is larger (smaller) than the equilibrium 3 ( )Ht x . 
 
This result may appear counter-intuitive because Proposition 3 says that even if the 
humans’ disutility of encountering carnivores is larger, when the value of herbivores is 
positive, the carnivore should spend more time in the city at optimum. This result tells us 
that when carnivores encroach into a city, we should not only try to drive carnivores out of 
the city, but also simultaneously take account of the effects of a change in the number of 
herbivores on the social welfare. The intuitive reason for this counter-intuitive result is as 
follows. When S3 is negative, an increase in the number of carnivores indicates a social cost; 
so, the RHS is positive. To satisfy (30), the LHS should be positive, that is, a marginal social 
benefit. When S2 is positive, an increase in the number of herbivores is socially beneficial. If 
carnivores stay longer in the city, they can eat more garbage, but face a higher risk of 
mortality. A longer 3 ( )Ht x  than the equilibrium increases the carnivore’s risk, and the 
increased risk is larger than the benefit of eating garbage. As shown in (11), this situation 
leads to an increase in the steady state population of herbivores, which is socially beneficial.  
Next, we focus on the time density of animals in the habitat.  
 
Proposition 3. The optimal time density of herbivores is spatially uniform across the habitat: 
2
2 ( )A A HTt x Z Z  .  (31) 
 
This assertion says that even at the optimum as well as in the market equilibrium, herbivores 
spend time spatially uniformly in the natutal habitat. But the optimal time density is different 
from that at the equilibrium because city sizes are different so that A HZ Z  is different.  
23  
Next, we focus on the carnivore’s one in the habitat 3 ( )At x . The optimal condition is 
33 2
2 2 3
2 2 [9] Benefit or cost of [10] Benefit or cost of decreasing herbivores increasing herbivores
( )[ ( ) ],( )
A
A
A A H
A
H
Z
Z t x dxS b S N t xt x Z Z
      

 
 (32) 
where 2
2
0( )A
b
t x
   at the equilibrium as shown in (24). The LHS indicates the benefit or 
cost of changes in the number of carnivores when the time density of herbivores marginally 
increases at [ , ]H Ax Z Z  within the habitat. The interpretation of the RHS is as follows. 
3 ( ) ( )A A H
A
H
Z
Z t x dx Z Z  implies the average time density of carnivores in the habitat. When 
increasing 2 ( )At x  at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z , the herbivore’s probability of meeting carnivores 
increases, which causes a reduction in the number of herbivores. This is represented by term 
[9]. At the same time, the herbivore’s time density in any other locations decreases. So, the 
herbivore’s probability of meeting carnivores decreases at that locations, which leads to an 
increase in herbivores. This is represented by term [10].  
Using the fact that the herbivore’s optimal time density is equal throughout the habitat, 
we can obtain that the optimal 3 ( )At x  varies (is constant) among locations when the density 
of wild plants, ( ( ))F a x , varies (is constant) among locations. Comparing the equilibrium 
condition (24) with the optimal condition (32), while keeping this relation in mind, we can 
obtain how the equilibrium 3 ( )At x  deviates from the optimum at any location. 
 
Proposition 4 (optimal time density of carnivores (i =3) in natural habitats).  
(i) When the density of wild plants, ( )F x , equal among locations, the optimum 3 ( )At x  
corresponds with the equilibrium 3 ( )At x  at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z .  
(ii) When the density of wild plants, ( )F x , varies among location, the optimal 3 ( )At x  at 
any [ , ]H Ax Z Z  can be either larger or smaller than the equilibrium 3 ( )At x  except for the 
location where the optimum 3 ( )At x  is equal to its average.  
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This assertion says that predator-prey interactions (that is, the probability of encountering 
between prey and predator species depending on the time density) are inefficient at each 
location unless the plant density is uniformly distributed. In view of some observation-based 
studies conducted by ecological researchers (e.g., Yoda et al., 2012; Pyke, 2015) reporting 
that animals optimize their food intake by spreading out in response to the current 
heterogeneity of each feeding ground, our results suggests that the current situation is 
inefficient.  
To clearly understand result (ii), suppose that ( )F x  linearly increases with x, and that S3 
< 0 and S2 > 0. Then, if ( )F x  is larger (smaller) than its average, then the sign of the RHS 
of (32) is positive. Thus, the optimal 3 ( )At x  is larger (smaller) than the equilibrium 3 ( )At x . 
This means that in places with higher ( )F x , the equilibrium herbivore’s risk of 
encountering predators is smaller than the optimum level. When increasing 3 ( )At x  beyond 
the equilibrium level, in the steady state, there is a decrease in not only the number of 
herbivores but also the number of carnivores, resulting from the decrease in their prey 
species. To achieve the optimum, 3 ( )At x  is increased so that the social marginal benefit of a 
decline in carnivores equals the social marginal cost of a decline in the number of herbivores. 
In places with lower ( )F x , vice versa. 
 
5.2 Human population density 
According to (16), ( )hn x  is the reciprocal of housing lot size ( )f x . The social optimum 
condition with respect to ( )f x  at any [ ,  ]Hx X Z  is 
 
3 3
2 3 3 3 2 3
3 3
[11] Benefit or cost of increasing herbivores [12] Benefit or cost of decreasing herbivores
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ( )) ( ) .( ) ( )
H H
Hh h h hU U n x t x n x t xr x S t x S k xf x C x P P   
       
 (33) 
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Since the RHS should equal zero at the equilibrium, we can obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 5. If 3 3 3 3( ) ( ) ( ( )) 0 ( 0)Hx k x t x      then the optimal human population 
density ( )hn x  is larger (smaller) than the market equilibrium at any [ ,  ]Hx X Z . 
 
The interpretation of (33) is given as follows. When the human population density 
decreases, the carnivores will feed on less food. So, from (11), the population of herbivores 
will increase. The first term in the RHS of (33) represents the externality of an increase in 
the population of herbivores. On the other hand, the carnivores face less risk of being killed 
by humans. From (11), this makes the number of herbivores decrease. The second term in the 
RHS of (33) represents the externality of decreasing the population of herbivores.  
In Proposition 5, 3( ) ( )x k x  reflects the humans’ response to harmful carnivores: if the 
response is large, they try to exterminate them even if the harmful carnivores stay in the 
urban areas for a short time. 3 3( ( ))Ht x  indicates the carnivores’ availability of food. The 
intuition behind this assertion is that if humans are eager to exterminate the harmful 
carnivores and/or the carnivores’ availability of food is quite low, then the optimal human 
density is larger than the equilibrium. 
 
5.3 Risk-increase measures against carnivores  
The social optimum condition with respect to 3( )x  at any [ ,  ]Hx X Z  is 
 
2 3 3
3 2
3
[13]Benefit  or cost of increasing herbivores
( ) ( ) ( )H
h
g x t x k xp SU C P


      
 (34) 
An interpretation of (34) is as follows. When giving more risk to carnivores such as 
preparing more sensitive alert system, then the carnivore’s net offspring decreases. From (11), 
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this leads to an increase in the number of herbivores in the steady state equilibrium. However, 
the number of carnivores does not increase at equilibrium because carnivores can eat more 
heribivores in the habitat instead of eating human-related sources of foods. 
The left hand side of (34) equaling zero is the equilibrium condition, and the sign of S2 
can be positive or negative from Proposition 1. Thus, we can obtain the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition 6. The first-best optimal probability of extermination per time the carnivore 
spends within the city 3( )x  is larger or smaller than the equilibrium one at any 
[ ,  ]Hx X Z .  
 
5.4 City size   
The equilibrium condition with respect to ZH is given by (18). However, this condition does 
not hold in the social optimum because of the externality of changes in the number of 
animals and plants. In addition, S2 and S3 can be either positive or negative depending on the 
situation, as in Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 7. The first best optimal city size can be larger or smaller than the market 
equilibrium city size. 
 
6. Numerical examples  
The purpose of numerical simulations is to understand how human–ecosystem interactions, 
such as the degree of human’s disutility to the encroachment of carnivores and the value of 
ecosystem services, would affect the first-best optimal city size. 
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Suppose the total length of an area consisting of a city plus a natural habitat is 60 km 
with a width of 1 km. We divide the city into four discrete areas and the natural habitat into 
five discrete areas. The total number of humans is normalized as 20hN   (thousands of 
humans).25 We specify the utility function as 1 2 3( ) ( ) ln ( ) ( ) ln ( )hv x C x b f x c M x c x     
3
1
i i
i
N

 , where b, c1, c2, and i  (  1,  2,  3i  ) are positive parameters. The parameters 
used in this simulation are collected from previous studies or real situations as much as 
possible. As in Kono and Kawaguchi (2015), the income per household per year is set at 
US$40,000. The housing parameter in the utility function b is set at 8,000, which results in 
20 percent of the income of US$40,000. We set the number of trips to the CBD as 225 round 
trips per year per person, average speed as 30 km/hour, travel cost including travel time as 
US$30/hour. Further, we set the cost of housing land development rH as US$20,000.  
Next, we set some ecosystem parameters in the Lotka-Volterra equations: i , i ,  mi  
 2,  3i , and ( )k x , and we specify some functions in the ecosystem model such as 
availability of food and plant density: ( )k x , 3 3( ( ))Ht x , 2 2( ( ))At x , and 1( )n x . Although 
these parameters and functions vary according to species, the number of carnivores is 
smaller than the number of the herbivores as long as these animals are in the same food 
chain. So, we set the ecosystem parameters so as to satisfy the food chain: 3 0.889  , 
2 0.604  , 2 1.43  , 3 0.244m  , 2 0.193m  , 1 1  , ( ) 1000k x  , 
2
2 2 2( ( )) 2( ( )) 0.5A At x t x    , and 3 3 3( ( )) exp(0.5 ( )) 1.32H Ht x t x    . We set the cost of the plant 
density control and the risk-increase-measure as p1 = 1 and p3 =1. 
Finally, we set some parameters representing the human-ecosystem interactions: i , c1, 
and c2. i  indicates the welfare effect of abundance of organism in species i, and c1 
 
25 Any unit of total number of households will do, as long as it is positive. For example, Eichner and Pethig 
(2006) used 100 as the total number of households. 
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represents the humans’ fear of encroaching carnivores. Therefore, 1 ic   represents the 
trade-off between them. We set 1 2 3       and c2 = 0.000117. Since these values vary 
according to the situation surrounding humans and ecosystems, we explore whether optimal 
city size is larger or smaller than the equilibrium city size according to 1c  . To conduct 
sensitivity analyses, we set the following combination of c1 and  : c1 = 2000, 5000, 8000, 
and  = 400, 500, 600.  
[Table 2 here] 
[Figure 4 here] 
Table 2 and Figure 4 present the results of how human-ecosystem interactions would 
affect the first-best optimal city size, number of species, and time density of carnivores 
within the city. Figure 4 shows that regardless of parameter c1 (see the solied lines), as 
parameter   decreases, the relationship between the equilibrium city size EHZ  and optimal 
city size OHZ  changes from E OH HZ Z  to E OH HZ Z . In other words, the optimal city size 
tends to be larger than the equilibrium city size as the value of ecosystem services   
decreases. Next, we focus on the changes in parameter c, taking parameter   as constant 
(see the dashed lines). Figure 4 shows that the larger c is, the smaller E OH HZ Z  is. This 
implies that the optimal city size tends to be larger than the equilibrium city size as the 
human’s fear of encroaching carnivores increases. Table 2 shows that regardless of parameter 
c, the optimal numbers of the three species are greater than those at the equilibrium, and the 
optimal number increases with  . In addition, regardless of c1, the optimal time density of 
carnivores in the residential area is smaller than the equilibrium one, and it decreases as   
decreases. 
The intuitive interpretation is as follows. Since the value of ecosystem services is high, 
the city government should expand the natural habitat to enrich the quality of ecosystem 
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services. On the other hand, when the value of ecosystem services is small, the humans’ fear 
of encountering carnivores is more influential on the welfare. Therefore, the government 
should expand the city to lower the length of time carnivores stay in the residential area. 
 
7. Conclusions  
This paper developed a new model that considers spatial interactions between humans and 
wildlife in cities and studied the equilibrium and the first-best or practically unconstranted 
optimal land use where the social planner controls both household and animal behaviors. We 
summarize what we have learned in this paper. There is a unique land use equilibrium where 
humans and an ecosystem interacts. At the equilibrium, animals are ununiformly distributed 
in the city: the density of carnivores is increasing, then decreasing, towards the CBD. In the 
habitat, only if the plant density varies among locations, the animals are ununiformly 
distributed. This spatial heterogeneity generates the distortion of predator-prey interactions. 
Consequently, the steady state population equilibrium of animals is inefficient.  
One important question which is unanswered by the current paper is how the social 
planner should design policies subject to the practical constraint, that is, it is impossible for 
us to regulate the animal behavior directly. One of the useful policies is land use regulation 
intended to influence residents and animal behavior indirectly, such as controlling city size 
and plants densities in natural habitats. The model we have developed in this paper provides 
the bases for analyzing such location dependent policies which are needed to create society 
coexsisting with biological resources. Yoshida and Kono (in press) characterizes the 
second-best land use policies in this framework. Other policies can be explored in a similar 
framework. For example, if the number of kinds of species is increased, we can explore 
which species are extinct and how we should handle that situation. 
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Figure 1. A city adjacent to a natural habitat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Best response functions of carnivores and humans at any [0, ]Hx Z . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. One example of equilibrium land use for humans and wildlife. 
Note: The left vertical axis indicates the human population density, the right vertical axis indicates the 
time density of animals, and the horizontal axis represents the distance from the CBD. The thin line, the 
bold line, and the double line represent the human population density ( )hn x , the time density of 
carnivores 3 ( )Ht x  on [ , ]HX Z  and 3 ( )At x  on [ , ]H AZ Z ), and the time density of herbivores 2 ( )At x , 
respectively. The time density of carnivores might be non-continuous at the urban boundary ZH. In the 
residential area with carnivores ( [ , ]Hx X Z ), the slope of ( )hn x  is steeper than that in the residential 
area without carnivores ( [0, ]x X ).  
Human zone (housing zone) 
 
Animal zone (covered by plants) 
 
ZH 
Urban 
boundary  
ZA 
Natural habitat  
boundary 
X 
Boundary of 
carnivores’ search 
range  
Carnivores’ search range  
0 
City 
center 
Herbivores’ search range  
    : ( )hn x  
       : 3 ( )jt x  
       : 2 ( )At x  
Width = 1 
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Figure 4. Numerical results: the location of urban boundary at the equilibrium and the 
first-best optimum 
Note: EHZ  and OHZ  denote the equilibrium and the optimal location of urban boundary, respectively. 
E O
H HZ Z   in vertical axis is the difference between them. c   in horizontal axis is the relation between 
the value of ecosystem services and the human’s fear of carnivores’ encroachment. The solied line in left, 
middle, and right indicate how E OH HZ Z  changes as   changes, taking c = 2000, 5000, and 8000 as 
given, respectively. The dashed line in upper, middle, and lower indicates how E OH HZ Z  changes as c 
changes, taking   = 400, 500, and 600 as given, respectively. 
c   
 
E O
H HZ Z (km) 
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Table 1. Endogenous and exogenous variables for each agent 
 External variables for each agent 
 Population Population Density Per capita income Urban boundary  
Number of plants 
that grows 
naturally 
Human hN  nh(x) W ZH  
Plant N1 n1(x)   F(x) 
Animals  Ni     
  
 Choice variables for each agent  
 
Utility / 
Net 
offspring 
Composite 
goods / 
Intake of 
prey species 
Number of 
predators 
each agent 
meets 
Lot housing 
size / Time 
density 
Boundary of  
search range 
(carnivores) 
Land 
rent 
Strength of 
the risk 
increase 
measure 
Humans  v(x) C(x) Mh(x) f (x)  r(x) β3(x) 
Animals bi Qij Mi tij(x) X   
 
Note: Except for hN , w, and F(x) all variables are endogenous to the model. 
 
 
36  
 
Table 2. Numerical results 
 (i) c = 2000 
 Laissez-faire equilibrium  First-best optimum 
 UGB (km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )Ht x  
 UGB 
(km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )Ht x  
400   14 36.5 10.6 2.3 0.091  16 39.3 11.6 2.8 0.034 
500   14 36.5 10.6 2.3 0.091  14 42.1 12.0 3.1 0.039 
600   14 36.5 10.6 2.3 0.091  10 46.7 13.2 3.4 0.051 
  
 (ii) c = 5000 
 Laissez-faire equilibrium  First-best optimum 
 UGB (km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )
Ht x   UGB (km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )
Ht x  
400   12 37.7 11.1 2.1 0.10  16 39.2 11.8 3.0 0.045  
500   12 37.7 11.1 2.1 0.10  14 42.0 12.3 3.2 0.045 
600   12 37.7 11.1 2.1 0.10  10 46.6 13.4 3.4 0.055 
  
 (iii) c = 8000 
 Laissez-faire equilibrium  First-best optimum 
 UGB (km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )Ht x  
 UGB 
(km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )Ht x  
400   12 37.7 11.3 2.0 0.095  18 37.2 11.7 2.9 0.044 
500   12 37.7 11.3 2.0 0.095  14 41.9 12.5 3.3 0.051 
600   12 37.7 11.3 2.0 0.095  10 46.5 13.6 3.4 0.057 
 
Note: i  and c indicates the positive welfare effect of biodiversity and the humans’ fear of encroaching 
carnivores, respectively. UGB is the location of urban growth boundary ZH.  
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Appendix A. First order conditions for the laissez-faire market equilibrium   
First, we set the Lagrangian function expressing the carnivore’s behavior in the laissez-faire 
equilibrium: 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3
( ) ( ( ) ( ) )
[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ]
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ].
A H A H
A A A A H H H H
h
H
h
A H
H
A H
H
H
Z Z
Z X
Z Z
Z X
Z
X
L Q Q M m T t x dx t x dx
Q t x t x N dx Q t x t x n x dx
M t x k x n x dx
  
  

      
   
 
 
 

     (A.1) 
Differentiating (A.1) with respective variables, we obtain (A.2)–(A.7): 
3 3
3
0: 0AALQ  
    , (A.2) 
3 3
3
0: 0HHLQ  
    ,  (A.3) 
3 3
3
0: 0LM  
     ,  (A.4) 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3
0: ( )[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( ) ( ) 0( )
H H H H
h hH
L n x t x t x t x k x n xt x     
      , (A.5) 
3 3 2 2
3
0: ( ) 0( )
A A
A
L t x Nt x  
     ,  (A.6) 
3 3 3 3 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H H H Hh hL t X t X X n X t X k X n XX    
     ,  (A.7) 
where we use the boundary condition 3 ( ) 0Ht X  . 
Next, we set the Lagrangian function expressing the herbivore’s behavior in the laissez-faire 
equilibrium:  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3
( ( ) )
[ ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( ) ].
A
A A A AA A
H H
A
H
Z Z
Z Z
Z
ZL Q M m T t x dx
Q t x t x n x dx M t x t x N dx
  
  
    
   

 
         (A.8) 
Differentiating (A-8) with respective variables, we obtain (A.9)–(A.11): 
2 2
2
0 : 0LQ  
    ,  (A.9) 
2 2
2
0 : 0LM  
     , (A.10) 
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2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
2
0 : ( )[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( ) 0( )
A A A A
A
L n x t x t x t x t x Nt x     
      .  (A.11) 
The first order conditions with respect to shadow prices are suppressed because they are obvious. 
 
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 1, 2, and 3 
Proof of Lemma 1. We investigate the sign of the derivative of residents’ best response function with 
respect to the time density of carnivores: the sign of 3( ) ( )Hdf x dt x . The first order condition of the 
bid rent maximization problem (19) with respect to ( )f x  at any [ ,  ]Hx X Z , taking the 
carnivore’s time density 3 ( )Ht x  as given, is   
 
1 2 3( ) ( ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )), ( )) 0( )
hw A x C V E g M x g x f x C
f x f
         
N   (B.1) 
 
Differentiating (B.1) with respect to ( )f x  and 3 ( )Ht x  yields 
 
 
2
2 2
3
1 2 3
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) 0,( ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )))
H
h h
h
w A x C C Cdf x df xf x f x f f
C g M M x dt xf V E g M x g x


          
     N　　　　　　　　　　　　
(B.2) 
 
where 0f
C
UC
f U
    , 1 2 3
1 0( ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )))h C
C
V E g M x g x U
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2
2
ff
C
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f U
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h
C
UU C
  , 
h
f
UU f
  , 
2
2
h
ff
UU f
  , and 
2
h
Cf
UU C f
   ).  
From the second order condition with respect to the bid rent maximization problem, 
 
2 2
2 2 2
( ) ( ) 1 0( ) ( )
r w A x C C C
f f x f x f f
            . (B.3) 
 
Hence we can obtain  

3
2
3 1 2 3
2 00
0
( ( ))( ) 1 0( ) ( ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))) ( )
h
H
h
g M x Ndf x C
rdt x V E g M x g x f x
f



          

N 
. (B.4) 
Next, we explore the monotonicity of the best response function 3( )HresR t  at 3 [0,  1]Ht  . We 
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need to prove that to every t1 and t2 in [0, 1] such that t1 < t2 ⇒ 2 1( ) ( )res resR t R t . Combining 
3( ) ( ) 0Hdf x dt x   and the mean value theorem yields that 3( ( ))HresR t x  is monotonically increasing 
in 3 ( )Ht x  on [0, 1]. 
Next, We investigate the sign of the derivative of the carnivores’ best response function with 
respect to the housing lot size: the sign of 3 ( ) ( )Hdt x df x . Substituting (23) into (22) with 
2 2( ) ( ) ( )A A H A Ht x T Z Z t Z    and (16) yields  
 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
1 1[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( ) ( ) ( ) 0( ) ( )
H H H A Ht x t x t x x k x t Z Nf x f x         .  (B.5) 
 
Differentiating (B.5) with respect to ( )f x  and 3 ( )Ht x  yields  
3 3 3 3 3 33 3 3 3 3 3 3
32
2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0( ) ( )
H H HH H H
H
t x t x t xt x t x t x x k x df x dt xf x f x
                .26 (B.6) 
Then,  
3 3 3 3 3 3 33
3 3 3 3 3 3
00
( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( )( ) 1 0.( ) ( )2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))
H H HH
H H H
t x t x t x x k xdt x
df x f xt x t x t x
   
  

            
 (B.7) 
Similarly, from the mean value theorem, ( ( ))carR f x  is monotonically decreasing in ( )f x . || 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. At the carnivores’ search boundary within a city X, the time density is zero and 
unique. It is thus sufficient to prove that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of a system of 
equilibrium conditions with respect to ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 3( )x  is different from 0 at all 
[ , ]Hx X Z . Then the system defines ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 3( )x  at all [ , ]Hx X Z  as Ck functions 
of x in some neighborhood of ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 3( )x  at all [ , ]Hx X Z  (from Sydsæter et al., 
2005, Chapter 6, 6.3). 
The system of equilibrium conditions with respect to ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 3( )x  is  
1 2 3[ ( ) ( ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )), ( ))] 0( )
hw A x C V E g M x g x f x C
f x f
          
N  (B.7) 
 
26 2 3 3 3 3 3 3( ) ( )HN M Q m P     . However, even if you increase f (x) at a certain location x, the change in N2 
is zero because there is no width dx． 
40  
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H H H A Ht x t x t x x k x t Z N f x           (B.8) 
2 3 3( ( )) 0Cg x p U    (B.9) 
Under the assumption that the choice of 3( )x  does not depend on the choice of f(x), totally 
differentiating this system with respect to endogenous variables ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 3( )x  at any 
location x yields 
 
3
3
3 2 3 3
2 3 3 2 30
2
2
1 0 10 0
( )
( )1 1( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )( ( ) ( ( ))) ( ) ( ( ) ( ( )))
( ) ( ) 1
( ) ( )
C C
h
C
Hh
h H
N
U U
g M N
U f
M xC Cg M dt x g x d xf G x g x t x f G x g x
w A x C C
f x f x f
  


    

       
       
  

　　　　　 
2
2
2
0
0
( ) ( ) 0,
r
f
C df x x dxf  
 
     
 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3
00
2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.H H H H A Ht x t x t x dt x t Z N df x x k x dx k x d x     

        
 
2 3 3
0
( ( )) ( ) 0g x d x 

   
In the matrix form, 
 

2
1 3 2 3
2
0 0 0
3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
0 0
2 3
0
( ) ( ( ))
( ) 2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
0 0 ( ( ))
h
C C
A H H H H
A
g M N g xr
f U f U f
t Z N t x t x t x k x
g x

   

  
 


                  
 
 

 
33
3
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .( )
0( )
H
df x x
x k x dxdt x
d x



              

 
Under the assumption where 3( ) 0    and 3( ) 0    on 3 ( ) [0,  1]Ht x  , the determinant of the 
Jacobian matrix of the system is always negative: 

2
2 3 3 2 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 22
00 0 0 0
( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H H H A Hh
C C C
g x g M N g xrA t t t t Z Nf U U U
    
   
                
. 
Hence, the equilibrium ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 3( )x  are continuous on [ , ]HX Z .  
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In addition, to investigate how ( )f x , 3 ( )Ht x , and 3( )x  change with x, we derive 
 2 3 3 2 33 3 3 3 3 3
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
3
( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))( ) 1 ( )[2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( ) ( ) 0,H H H h
C C C
H
g x g M N g xdf x x t x t x t x x k xdx A U U U
dt
    
  
  
 
                
  
 
 
2
2 3 2 3
3 3 2 22
00
0 0 0
0 0
3
( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
( ) 0.
A H
C C
x g x g xr x k x x t Z Ndx A f U U
d x
dx
   


  
 
              

 
 
 
Since ( ) 0df xdx   at any [ , ]
Hx X Z , the urban boundary ZH is uniquely determined. This implies 
that there is no sub-center and natural habitats within residential districts in a city.  
 
   Next, we consider the equilibrium path of the time density of both carnivores and herbivores 
within habitats: 3 ( )At x  and 2 ( )At x . Combining (23) and (4) at which i = 2 yields 
2 ( ) ( )A A Ht x T Z Z  , implying that the time density of herbivores is spatially uniform everywhere at 
the equilibrium. Since 2 ( ) ( )A A Ht x T Z Z   and the urban boundary ZH is uniquely determined, 
2 ( )At x  is unique at all [ , ]H Ax Z Z . Next, solving (24) for 3 ( )At x  after using (13) yields  
 
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3
2 3
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))( )
A A A A
A F x t x N t x t x t xt x N
    

          at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z . (B.3) 
Because of the unique equilibrium path of the carnivore’s time density within the city and the 
uniqueness of ZH, the carnivore’s total time spent in the natural habitat is uniquely determined. In 
addition, there is one variable depending on the location in (B.3): exogenous variable ( )F x , and it 
has a unique path on [ , ]H AZ Z  and ( ) 0F x   at all [ , ]H Ax Z Z . Hence, 3 ( )At x  is continuous on 
[ , ]H AZ Z . Combining the carnivore’s total time spent in the habitat (4) and (B.3) determines 3 ( )At x  
at all [ , ]H Ax Z Z  uniquely.|| 
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Proof of Lemma 3. V is determined such that (17) is satisfied, that is, 
( )
0 ( , )h h
HZ VN n V x dx  . (B.4) 
To show the uniqueness of V, it is sufficient to prove that the RHS of (B.4) monotonically changes in 
V. Let ( )V  be the RHS of (B.4). We can obtain  
 
( )
0
( ) ( )( ( )) 0.
H
H h
h
HZ V dnd V dZ Vn Z V dxdV dV dV
      (B.5) 
The proof of (B.5) is given as follows. From the comparative static analysis of the bid rent 
maximization problem, ( ) 0df x dV  , given 3 ( )Ht x . This implies that the best response function of 
( )f x , shown as B-C line in Figure 2, shifts upward. So, we can obtain ( ) 0df x dV   at all 
[0,  ]Hx Z . From (16), ( , ) 0hdn V x dV  . The second term on the LHS of (B.5) is thus negative. 
To satisfy ( ) 0df x dV   at all x, the market land rent should decrease at all [0,  ]Hx Z . This 
implies that the city size becomes small: ( ) 0HdZ V dV  . The first term on the LHS of (B.5) is thus 
negative. Therefore, the LHS of (B.5) is monotonically decreasing in V. || 
Appendix C. First order conditions for the first-best optimum 
The Lagrangian function (26) can be rewritten as  
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     
3 3
3 3
1 2 3
1 1 2
0 0
0 0
0
( ) 1[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )( ) ( )
[ [ ( ) ] ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )[ ( ) (
h
h
h
H
h h h
h h
A
H H
H H
H
Z Z
Z Z
Z
N VL
x w C x f x r x p x x dx x n x dxf x f x
r x r dx N x M x t x N dx
x U C x f x g M x g x E V dx
s x F x t

   

 


          
       
       
 
 
 
 N
2 1
2 2 2 2 1 2
1 1 1 3 3
2 2 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2
3 3 2
) ( )]
( ) ( ( )) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( )
A A
A A
H H H
h h
A A
A
H
H H
A
H
A
H
A
A H
H Z
Z
Z Z
X X
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z Z
Z
x N n x dx
t x t x n x dx mS n x dx N S N
t x t x dx
x t x k x n x dx t x t x n x dx mS N
t x t x dx
 

  


            
   


 
 

3 3 3 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ].O A H O A
A H
H
A
H
Z Z
Z X
Z
ZT t x dx t x dx T t x dx 
   
       　  (C.1) 
Differentiating (C.1) with respective variables, we obtain (C.2)–(C.17): 
 2
( ) 10 : ( ) ( ) ( ) 0( ) ( ) ( )
h
h
UL r xx x xf x f x ff x  
       ,  (C.2) 
( )0 : ( ) 0( ) ( )
h hx UL xC x f x C
        ,  (C.3) 
0 : ( ) 1 0( ) h
L xr x 
     , (C.4) 
0
( )0 : 0( )
h
h
HZ xL dx Nf x
     ,  (C.5) 
32
3 3 3 2 3
3
( )0 : ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) 0( )
H H H
h
xL Sx t x t x S t x k xn x P P
  
      ,  (C.6) 
00 : ( ) 0h
HZNL x dxV 
     ,  (C.7) 
0 : ( ) ( ) 0( ) ( )h h
L gx xM x M x 
     ,  (C.8) 
3 3
3 30 0
0 : ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,HH HZ ZL Ex dx x t x dx SN N 
         (C.9) 
1 1 2 2
2 20
0 : ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,AH AHZ ZZ
L Ex dx s x t x dx SN N 
          (C.10) 
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1
1 10
0 : ( ) 0HZL Ex dx SN N
     ,   (C.11) 
2
1 1 3 2 2 2
1 2
0: ( ) ( ) ( ( )) 0( )
A AL S s x S t x t xn x P
 
     ,    (C.12) 
1 1 2 2
3 2
2 3 3 3 3
3
2
3 2 2 2 1
2
32
2 3 2 3 3 2
0 : ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
H H O A H
HH
H
H H H H H H H H H
h h
A H H H H
A H A H A H A H
L r Z r S n Z t ZZ
Z SS t Z k Z n Z t Z t Z n ZP P
S t Z t Z n ZP
NNS t Z t Z S t Z t ZP P

 
 
    
 

  
  (C.13) 
2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3
3
2
3
( )0 : ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
O H H H Hh
H
h
S n xL x N t Z t x t xt x P
xS k x n xP
   


       
 　　　　　
    (C.14) 
32
3 2 2 3 2
3
0 : ( ) ( ) 0 ( )
O A A
A
NL NS t x S t xt x P P
      ,     (C.15) 
2 1 2
1 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
2 2
3
3 3 2
( )0 : ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )( )
( ) 0.
A A A A
A
A O
L n x Ns x N S t x t x t x S t xt x P P
NS t xP
  

      
  
  (C.16) 
32
3 3 3 3 2 3
3
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0O H H Hh hXL St X t X X n X S t X k X n XX P P
  
     ,  (C.17) 
32
3 2
3 3 3
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0( ) ( ) ( )
H
h hx t x k x n xL gp x Sx f x x P
   
       ,  (C.18) 
The first order conditions with respect to Lagrangian multipliers are omitted. 
Appendix D. Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 7 
Proof of Proposition 1. Combining (C.3), (C.4), and (16) yields ( )( ) h
h
n xx U C    , and plugging this 
into (C.8) yields ( ) ( ) hh
h
g Mx n x U C
    . Substituting these equations into (C.9) and solving for S3 
yields (27). Likewise, solving (C.10) for S2 yields (28). Solving (C.11) for S1 with ( )( ) h
h
n xx U C     
yields 11 0 ( )h h
HZ E NS n x dxU C
    . Substituting this equations into (C.12) and solving for 1( )s x  
yields (29).|| 
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Proof of Proposition 2. From (C.15), 2 3( )A Ot x   , where 322 3 NNS SP P    . Substituting 
this into (4) for i = 2, 3 ( )O A HT Z Z   , and then solving for 3O   yields 
3 ( )O A HT Z Z    . Therefore, we can obtain the optimal time density of herbivores: 
2 ( ) ( )A A Ht x T Z Z  .|| 
Proof of Proposition 7. From the proof of Proposition 1, 11 0 ( ) 0h h
HZ E NS n x dxU C
    . 
Arranging (C.13) yields  
 
1 1
2
3 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 2
2
[13] Costdue to a decrease in plants
[14] Benefit or cost of decreasing the population of carnivores
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[15] Benefit or cost of decreasing the time density of herbivores
[16] Benefit or cost of decreasing the population of herbivore
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The market city boundary is determined at which r(ZH) = rH. Since S2 and S3 can be either positive or 
negative, the RHS of this equation can be either positive or negative. Hence, if the RHS of this 
equation is positive, then the social optimal city size is smaller than the equilibrium city size. If it is 
negative, then the social optimal city size is larger than the equilibrium city size.|| 
 
 
 
